Faculty Colloquium with Maziar Peihani

From (no) bailouts to bail-in: a comparative
assessment of Canada's bank recapitalization
regime

Bail-in within resolution has been at the forefront of the regulatory agenda to end too-big-to-fail. The presentation will explore Canada’s recently introduced bail-in framework through a comparative lens in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that Canada embraces a less stringent approach than its international counterparts in applying the bail-in tool and permitting the use of public funds. This flexible approach is preferable as it can help stabilize the bailed-in bank by facilitating its access to liquidity. Yet, the administration of the bail-in tool will not be without difficulties in Canada. The extensive administrative discretion and opaqueness embedded in the regime come at the expense of rule of law and creditor protection. Further challenges arise from the country’s highly concentrated financial system and interdependencies among the large banks which can also result in a reluctance to turn to bail-in if systemic solvency concerns are present.

The presenter will deliver this lecture in person at Allard Hall and via video. Please contact Michelle Burchill at burchill@allard.ubc.ca for the Zoom link.

About the Speaker

Maziar's teaching and research focus is on financial and business law, with his current areas of research including banking regulation, resolution of cross-border bank failures, sovereign debt restructuring, and disclosure and governance of climate-related financial risks. Maziar's research has appeared in the Harvard International Law Journal and the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. He received  his  PhD  in law  from  UBC where his doctoral thesis examined the legitimacy and efficacy of the global governance regime of international banking.