Event Description
In an article in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, “Unconditional Love, Some Implications for the Law,” I argued, provocatively, that the concept of “unconditional love” is useful for explaining why the law has certain modal features: viz., obligations to care for adult disabled children, to not abort pregnancy, to visit incarcerated kin, and to not testify in court against one's spouse. In this talk, I explore whether two recent papers related to love, one about “objectionable obligations” (Sophia Moreau, Philosophical Review, 2026) and the other about “general love” (P Quinn White, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2025), bear on my arguments. Core philosophical perspectives in these papers are not only consonant with my claims, but further illuminate grounds for caution against baking love-based obligations into the law.
Event details: This event is open to the general public and does not require registration (but please note that our seating is limited). The event will be followed by a reception in the Piano Lounge, Graham House.
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